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Abstract: The so-called “terrorist diaspora” of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) to their countries of 
residence after the defeat of Daesh is a primary concern not only for European countries, but also for the 
international community as a whole. Some studies have been focused on the causes of this phenomenon 
and its effects. However, less attention has been paid to the effects of counter-terrorism measures. Since 
Resolution 1373, the United Nations Security Council has been developing a binding global framework 
against terrorism, and Resolution 2178 is the icing on this cake. This framework, accepted by many 
regional organizations such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, forces States to adopt 
measures against FTFs in areas of criminal, administrative and civil law. Firstly, these measures affect 
individuals because of the restrictions imposed on certain fundamental rights, such as privacy or freedom 
of movement. Secondly, a radical interpretation of these measures followed by its unilateral adoption can 
cause anarchy in the international relations between the States of origin of FTFs and the States of 
destination. For instance, measures preventing the movement of terrorists can be translated into the 
expulsion of residents or nationality deprivation, driving them to countries with less capabilities to deal 
with this risk. A strategy which, at the end, will increase instability in a globalised world. For these 
reasons, this paper proposes that the global and European frameworks against FTFs should be used as a 
tool to coordinate efforts, and not as a justification to defend short-term national security interests to the 
detriment of long-term international security.  
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Resumen: La denominada «diáspora» de combatientes terroristas extranjeros (CTE) a sus países de 
residencia tras la derrota del Daesh es una preocupación no sólo para los Estados europeos, sino también 
para la comunidad internacional en su conjunto. Varios estudios se han centrado en las causas de este 
fenómeno y sus efectos. Sin embargo, menos atención se ha prestado a los efectos de las medidas 
antiterroristas adoptadas. Desde la Resolución 1373, el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas ha 
desarrollado un marco global de lucha contra el terrorismo, y la Resolución 2178 es la guinda de este 
papel. Este marco, aceptado por múltiples organizaciones regionales como la Unión Europea y el 
Consejo de Europa, obliga a los Estados a adoptar diversas medidas contra los CTE en materia de 
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derecho penal, administrativo y civil. En primer lugar, estas medidas afectan a los individuos ya que 
imponen restricciones en ciertos derechos fundamentales, tales como el derecho a la libertad o a la libre 
circulación. En segundo lugar, una interpretación radical de estas medidas seguidas de una adopción 
unilateral puede causar la anarquía en las relaciones internacionales entre los Estados de origen de los 
CTE y los Estados de destino. Por ejemplo, las medidas que buscan prevenir la circulación de terroristas 
pueden traducirse en la expulsión de residentes o en la revocación de su nacionalidad, guiándolos hacia 
países con menos capacidades para lidiar con este riesgo. Una estrategia que, al final, incrementará la 
inestabilidad en un mundo globalizado. Por estas razones, este estudio propone que el marco global y 
europeo contra los CTE debe ser utilizado como una herramienta para coordinar esfuerzos, y no como 
una justificación para defender intereses de seguridad nacional a corto plazo en detrimento de la 
seguridad internacional a largo plazo.   
 
Palabras clave: Naciones Unidas, Unión Europea, Consejo de Europa, Combatientes Terroristas 
Extranjeros, revocación de la nacionalidad, Derecho penal.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The terrorist attacks in Brussels (2014) and Paris (2015) highlighted the 
growing threat of foreign terrorist fighters associated with Daesh1. A phenomenon 
that has affected not only Europe, but also other regions of the world. The 
Philippines has been the scenario of constant fights between the national armed 
forces and local terrorist groups supported by foreign terrorist fighters trained by 
Daesh2. Officials from countries such as Morocco or Algeria have voiced concern 
that “North African fighters are returning home from the collapsing Daesh caliphate 
in Syria, raising the terrorism risk”3.  
Since 2013, the Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre, a project of the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), has been following the 
participation of foreign fighters to terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq4. In 
September 2014, the UNSC gave the first official definition of “foreign terrorist 
fighters” as “nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their 
States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to 
travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or 
nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or 
                                                 
1 For different case studies see Braithwaite, A. and Chu, T.S. (2018), “Civil Conflicts Abroad, Foreign 
Fighters, and Terrorism at Home”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (8), pp. 1636-1660.  
2 Gunaratna, R. (2017), “Marawi: a Game Changer in Terrorism in Asia”, Counter Terrorist Trends and 
Analyses: A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 9 (7), p. 4; 
Singh, B. and Ramakrishna, K. (2016), “Islamic State’s Wilayah Philippines: Implications for Southeast 
Asia”, 187 RSIS Commentary.  
3 Abebe, T.T. (2017), “Algeria and Morocco: developing inclusive strategies can prevent violent 
extremism”, Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief 112, p. 5.   
4 INTERPOL, “Foreign terrorist fighters Information Sheet”. Available at:  
https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Terrorism/Foreign-terrorist-fighters 
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participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, 
including in connection with armed conflicts”5.  
Apart from defining the term of “foreign terrorist fighters”, UNSC 
Resolution 2178 imposes on all States the obligation to adopt a wide range of 
criminal, administrative and civil measures. Its content has also been transposed in 
the framework of the Council of Europe and the EU. Although the direct addressee 
of these obligations is the sovereign State, they can also have an impact in the 
individual because of its possible interpretation by the State when transposing it, or 
because of the specific nature of some of these obligations 6. This study explores the 
impact of two specific measures adopted against the threat of foreign terrorist 
fighters, namely the revocation of citizenship and the preventive criminal law 
instruments, and how they affect the rights and obligations of both individuals and 
States7.  
2. REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP 
In the eighteenth century, the Italian jurist Beccaria compared deprivation of 
citizenship with the “death in respect to the body politic”8. In this sense, “this 
political death is a sibling to the historic practice known as civil death, whereby 
slaves and felons were denied legal personhood. The individual remains physically 
alive and present in the community, but is no longer recognized as an autonomous 
legal subject capable of contracting, suing and being sued, or otherwise participating 
in civic life”9.  
In the past few years, many States have passed laws against terrorist fighters, 
enabling authorities to revoke the citizenship of nationals convicted of terrorism 
offences10. In 2014, Bahrain introduced in its legislation the possibility to revoke 
                                                 
5 UNSC, Resolution 2178 of 24th September 2014, Doc. S/RES/2178, p. 2. This definition has been 
criticised because it “blurs the lines between terrorism and armed conflicts”. See generally GENEVA 
ACADEMY, “Foreign Fighters under International Law”, Academic Briefing 7, 2014, p. 42. Available 
at:  
https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-
files/Publications/Academy%20Briefings/Foreign%20Fighters_2015_WEB.pdf  
6 For some remarks on the direct effect of UNSC Resolution 2178 on the individual see Peters, A. 
(2014), “Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): ‘The Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ as an International 
Legal Person”, EJIL Talk. Available at:  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-fighter-as-an-
international-legal-person-part-i/  
7 For a general study of all the measures adopted by the EU against FTFs see, among others, López-
Jacoiste (2016), E., “La Unión Europea ante los Combatientes Terroristas Extranjeros”, Revista de 
Estudios Europeos 67 (1), pp. 47-71.  
8 Beccaria, C. (2009), On Crime and Punishment (translation).Transaction Publishers. New Brunswick, 
p. 63.  
9 Macklin, A. (2013), “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the 
Alien”, Queen’s Law Journal 40 (1), pp. 1-54.  
10 Although we acknowledge that there is a conceptual difference between “nationality” and 
“citizenship”, this study is not focused on the difference between them but on the direct consequences 
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citizenship on terrorism charges, disregarding whether they are dual nationals or 
not11. This new piece of legislation has raised many concerns because of its 
application to civil society activists, journalists and religious figures12. Since 2015, 
Australia’s Allegiance Act grants the immigration minister the power to revoke the 
citizenship of dual nationals if there are reasons to believe that they have 
participated in terrorist activities, even on the basis of suspicion if the act was 
allegedly committed overseas, or the individual is overseas at that time13. Dutch 
legislation from 2017 allows the revocation of citizenship of dual nationals 
suspected of having joined or fought abroad along with a terrorist group14. Belgium 
also allows the revocation from dual nationals, although in this case there are 
stronger concerns on discrimination due to the high number of Belgian nationals 
with African nationalities15. For this last situation, we should keep in mind that 
article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination guarantees “the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, 
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the 
enjoyment […] of the right to nationality”.  
Could we say that this measure is a consequence of the obligations imposed 
on States by UNSC Resolution 2178?16. It is difficult to response positively. First of 
all, because many States adopted measures to revoke the citizenship of individuals 
related to terrorism before Resolution 2178 was even approved by the UNSC in 
201417. In addition, the requirement to revoke the citizenship of terrorist fighters 
cannot be found anywhere in the wording of the resolution. By contrast, the UNSC 
                                                                                                                  
that deprivation of citizenship has on the right to nationality. In few words, citizenship refers to all rights 
and obligations attributed to their own State at domestic level, while nationality concerns the 
international dimension of this relationship. See generally Giustiniani, F.Z. (2016), “Deprivation of 
nationality: In Defence of a principled approach”, Questions of International Law 31, pp. 5-20; 
Combacau, J. and Sur, S. (2016), Droit international public. LGDJ. Issy-les-Moulineaux, pp. 329-335.  
11 For a review of recent counterterrorism law in Bahrain see Almutawa, A. (2018), “Terrorism measures 
in Bahrain: proportionality and the interplay between security, civil liberties and political stability”, The 
International Journal of Human Rights 22 (8), pp. 949-965.  
12 Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy, Stop Revoking Citizenships –BIRD Publishes Full 
Documentation (2016). Available at:  
http://birdbh.org/2016/02/revoked-citizenship/  
13 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia Act) 2015, No. 166, Section 33A. 
Available at:  
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2015A00166 
14 Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Ministry of Justice and Security of the Netherlands, “Loss 
and the revoking of Dutch nationality”. Available at: 
https://ind.nl/en/dutch-citizenship/Pages/Loss-and-the-revoking-of-Dutch-nationality.aspx  
15 Tayler, L. (2016), “Foreign Terrorist Fighter Laws: Human Rights Rollbacks Under UN Security 
Council Resolution 2178”, International Community Law Review 18, pp. 455-482, p. 470.  
16 For this topic, see generally Webb, A.K. (2017), “Swanning back in? Foreign fighters and the long 
arm of the state”, Citizenship Studies 21 (3), pp. 291-308.  
17 For example, the idea of revocation of revocation of citizenship from individuals engaged in terrorist 
activities was proposed in the United States by Senator Joseph Lieberman in 2010. See generally Spiro, 
P.J. (2014), “Expatriating terrorists”, Fordham Law Review 82 (5), pp. 2169-2187; Forcese, C. (2014), 
“A Tale of Two Citizenships: Citizenship Revocation for ‘Traitors and Terrorists”, Queen’s Law Journal 
39 (2), pp. 551-586.  
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specifically addressed in paragraph 8 that nothing among the obligations imposed 
by the Resolution “shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from 
its territories of its own nationals or permanent residents”.  
2.1. Impact on the individual 
The power of the State to revoke citizenship must be analysed in connection 
with the human right to nationality18. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights establishes that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no 
one shall be arbitrary deprived of his or her nationality. Article 8 of the 
Statelessness Convention establishes that States parties “shall not deprive a national 
of his nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless”19. However, 
according to paragraph 3 of the same provision, States can deprive a person of his 
nationality if “inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the 
person has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests 
if the State”.  
As we can directly see from the more recent title of the Australian counter-
terrorism law, the obligation of “allegiance” or “loyalty” is closely connected to 
nationality and its revocation. This connection could derive from the definition of 
“nationality” given by the International Court of Justice, according to which it is a 
“legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights 
and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the 
individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an 
act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the 
State conferring nationality than with that of any other State”20.  
Nationality has been traditionally seen as a matter of domestic jurisdiction of 
sovereign States21. However, the power of the State to deprive a person of his 
nationality is not without limits. Article 8 (4) of the Statelessness Convention 
establishes that nationality cannot be revoked “except in accordance with law, 
which shall provide for the person concerned the right to a fair hearing by a court or 
other independent body”. Regarding the term “not arbitrary” of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council understands it as a 
measure “serving a legitimate purpose, being the least intrusive instrument to 
achieve the desired result and being proportional to the interest to be protected”22.  
                                                 
18 Mantu, S. (2018), “Terrorist citizens and the human right to nationality”, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies 26 (1), pp. 28-41, p. 29.  
19 For a comprehensive study of the issue of statelessness see Conklin, W.E. (2014), Statelessness: the 
Enigma of the International Community. Hart Publishing. Oxford.  
20 ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase), Merits, Judgment 27 June 1955, 
ICJ Rep 1955, p.26. 
21 Ibidem.   
22 UNGA, Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the 
Secretary General, 19 December 2013, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/28, p. 4.  
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Although the right to citizenship is not guaranteed by the ECHR or its 
Protocols, the ECtHR has solved some cases related to citizenship on grounds of the 
right to respect for private and family life (article 8 of the ECtHR)23.  On 27 June 
2013, an application was lodged with the ECtHR concerning the revocation of 
British citizenship of an individual with Sudanese and British nationalities, while he 
has abroad, because of terrorism-related activities24. The ECtHR considered that the 
removal of citizenship in this case was not arbitrary on several grounds.  
First, because the measure was adopted in accordance with existing UK law. 
Second, because an out-of-country appeal does not make a decision automatically 
arbitrary: the procedural guarantees were duly respected by the UK. Third, because 
he was not rendered statelessness as far as he still preserved the Sudanese 
nationality. Fourth, because the interference with individual rights was very limited: 
his right to private and family life that his family were no longer living in the UK. 
And last but not least, the ECtHR considered that the aim of protecting the public 
from the threat of terrorism is a legitimate aim.  
Taking into account the growing practice of citizenship revocation, it 
remains to be seen if, in the near future, the ECtHR will find these measures 
contrary to the ECHR in a case-by-case basis. There are already some pending 
applications from French citizens, convicted by terrorism and deprived from 
citizenship on this ground, because of an alleged violation of their right to identity 
under article 8 of the ECtHR25. Even more recently, the British government has 
started to revoke the citizenship of individuals without current double nationality, 
but with the possibility to obtain it. In a case concerning two British alleged 
Islamists, the government defended that the men were eligible for Bangladeshi 
citizenship and, therefore, they would not be rendered stateless as a result of the 
revocations. However, the Special Immigration and Appeals Commission found that 
they had been made stateless and, therefore, that the action of the government was 
illegal under international law26.  
Depriving an individual from his or her citizenship is not banal decision. It 
has an enormous consequence: the loss of protection of the human rights recognised 
by that State. Although “all persons should by virtue of their essential humanity 
enjoy all human rights”, the UN has also recognised, after a review of international 
human rights law, that “unless exceptional distinctions, for example between 
citizens and non-citizens, serve a legitimate State objective and are proportional to 
the achievement of that objective. For example, non-citizens should enjoy freedom 
                                                 
23 See generally ECtHR, Genovese v. Malta (App. No. 53124/09), Fourth Section, 11 October 2011.  
24 ECtHR, K2 v. the United Kingdom (App. No.  42387/13), First Section, 9 March 2017.  
25 ECtHR, Ghoumid v. France (App. No. 52273/16), Charouali v. France (App. No. 52285/16), Turk v. 
France (App. No. 52290/16), Aberbri v. France (App. No. 52294/16) and Ait El Haj v. France (App. No. 
2302/16), 23 May 2017.  
26  Dearden, L. (2018) “UK blocked from making alleged extremists stateless by secret court in ruling 
that will set precedent”, The Independent. Available at:  
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/british-citizenship-removal-isis-terrorists-extremists-
stateless-illegal-blocked-court-bangladesh-a8645241.html  
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from arbitrary killing, inhuman treatment slavery, forced labour, child labour, 
arbitrary arrest, unfair trial, invasions of privacy, refoulement and violations of 
humanitarian law. They also have the right to marry, protection as minors, peaceful 
association and assembly, equality, freedom of religion and belief, social, cultural, 
and economic rights in general, labour rights (for example, as to collective 
bargaining, workers’ compensation, social security, appropriate working conditions 
and environment, etc.) and consular protection. While all human beings are entitled 
to equality in dignity and rights, States may draw narrow distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens with respect to political rights explicitly guaranteed to 
citizens and freedom of movement”27.   
2.2. Impact on the State 
At first sight, when a State decides to revoke the citizenship of an individual, 
there is only one category of victims: the individual concerned, and also possibly 
the relatives attached to them. However, if we go one step further, we can see that 
the damage does not only affect the relationship among the State and its former 
“subject”. It can also have a negative impact on the peaceful functioning of 
international relations. This impact can be particularly dangerous if the citizenship 
has been revoked due to the connection of the individual with terrorist activities.   
Revocation of citizenship in the case of foreign terrorist fighters can take 
place in a scenario as follows: a national from State A travels to State B for the 
purpose of terrorism. While this individual is abroad, State B decides to revoke his 
or her citizenship. How can this act affect the international relations between 
sovereign States? It has been noted that revocation of citizenship against individuals 
who are abroad “engage the legal interests of other States and may violate its 
rights”28. When a person travels abroad, a wide range of obligations emerges not 
only between the individual and the State, but also between the State of origin and 
the State of destination.  
First of all, a State which admits into its territory a national from a foreign 
State is entitled to deport him or her, under certain circumstances, to his or her Sate 
of nationality. International law does not provide with a definitive and 
comprehensive framework on the matter, but we can find certain guidelines. Article 
3 of the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens adopted by the International Law 
                                                 
27 UN Commission of Human Rights, Prevention of discrimination: the rights of non-citizens, 6 May 
2003, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23. In this sense, Hannah Arendt criticised that “no paradox of 
contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of 
well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights, which are 
enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless 
themselves”. See Arendt, H. (1979), The Origins of Totalitarism. Harcourt, Brace & World. London, p. 
279.  
28 Krähenmann, S. (2016), “The Obligations under International Law of the Foreign Fighter’s State of 
Nationality or Habitual Residence, State of Transit and State of Destination”, in De Guttry, A., Capone, 
F. and Paulussen, C. (eds.), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond. Springer. The Hague, 
pp. 229-282, p. 249.  
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Commission establishes that “A State has the right to expel an alien from its 
territory. Expulsion shall be in accordance with the present draft articles, without 
prejudice to other applicable rules of international law, in particular those relating to 
human rights”29. Article 5 does not give a list of specific grounds of expulsion, but it 
establishes the general guidelines which every decision of expulsion must comply 
with. In his preliminary report, the UN Special Rapporteur for the expulsion of 
aliens identifies, among other common grounds of expulsion in domestic law, that 
the individual in question is a criminal or is being prosecuted30.  
On the other hand, the State of nationality is obliged to accept the return of 
its own nationals. This is a consequence of the right that every person has to enter 
and leave their State of nationality31. Nevertheless, if the citizenship of a suspected 
terrorist fighter is revoked while abroad, then the State’s obligation to accept him is 
completely circumvented. This conduct of “ad hoc denationalization would provide 
a ready means of evading these duties. In appropriate circumstances responsibility 
would be established for breach of duty”32.  In such a situation, “the good faith of a 
State which has admitted an alien on the assumption that the State of his nationality 
is under an obligation to receive him back would be deceived if by subsequent 
denationalisation this duty were to be extinguished”33.  
For some authors, this unilateral measure can even affect the principle of 
non-interference: the receiving State’s sovereignty would be violated as far as it can 
no longer deport the individual to his country of origin, even if the situation at hand 
complies with all requirements under its national law and international human rights 
law34. This practice could lead “to a race between states as to who denationalizes 
first, creating friction in international relations”35 and, at the end, “the delicate 
                                                 
29 ILC, Draft Articles on the expulsion of aliens, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2014, 
Vol. II, Part II. Available on:  
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_12_2014.pdf&lang=EF  
30 ILC, Preliminary report on the expulsion of aliens, by Mr. Maurice Kanto, Special Rapporteur, 2 June 
2005, UN Doc. A/CN.4554, par. 19. Available on: 
 http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_12_2014.pdf&lang=EF  
31 According to article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “everyone has the right to leave 
any country, including his own, and to return to his country”. Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights guarantees that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his 
own country”. In addition, article 3 of the 4th Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
article 22(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights, article 12(2) of the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights and article 27 of the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights prohibit the 
expulsion of nationals. 
32 Crawford, J. (2012),  Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford, p. 520.  
33 Weis, P. (1979), Nationality and statelessness in international law. Stijhoff and Noordhoff. Alphen 
aan den Rijn, pp. 125-126.  
34 Burchardt, D. and Gulati, R. (2018) “International Counter-terrorism Regulation and Citizenship-
stripping Laws—Reinforcing Legal Exceptionalism”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law 23 (2), pp. 203-
228.  
35 Ibidem. See also Laine, T. (2017), “‘Passing the Buck’: Western States Race to Denationalise Foreign 
Terrorist Fighters”, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 12 (2), pp. 22-35.  
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balance of States and individual rights that the international community has worked 
so hard to achieve will start to erode”36.   
Second, revocation of citizenship of suspected terrorists while they are 
abroad also entails a risk for the security of other States and the international 
community as a whole. As some author has pointed out, “it is appropriate or even 
lawful to ‘export’ terrorism risks to other countries, especially as they probably have 
less information and capability to deal with the risk?”37. Indeed, this policy can 
increase the safety of the State of origin in the short term, but it can motivate 
terrorist to operate in jurisdictions with less controls and resources or, in other 
words, this State’s policy “will drive terrorist to another state”38.   
In relation to the global decrease of security, the revocation of citizenship on 
grounds of terrorism is also a way to elude some of the obligations assumed by the 
States parties to the framework of international conventions against terrorism. 
Fourteen out of nineteen of the sectorial conventions against terrorism establish that 
each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction when the offence is committed by a national of that State39. Eluding this 
obligation goes against the purpose of all these conventions, meaning the exclusion 
of impunity for terrorist acts with transnational elements. It is also arguable that this 
avoidance of responsibility goes against the right to receive justice of the victims of 
terrorist attacks40.  
                                                 
36 Esbrook, L.  (2016), “Citizenship unmoored: expatriation as a counter-terrorism tool”, University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 37 (4), pp. 1273-1329, pp. 1306-1307.  
37 Walker, C. (2014), “Counterterrorism and Security Bill 14-15, Submission to Joint Committee on 
Human Rights”, 5 December 2014, p. 5. Available on:  
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/Prof_Clive_Walker_Submission.pdf   
38 Feinberg, M. (2017), “Terrorism Inside Out: Legislating for Humanity to Cooperate against 
Terrorism”, North Carolina Journal of International Law 42, pp. 505-543, p. 523.  
39 See the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft as amended by the 2010 
Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; the 1973 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents; the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages; the 
1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, including its 1988 Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, its 
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation and its 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; the 1997 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism; the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism and, finally, the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to 
International Civil Aviation.  
40 For a study on the victims of terrorism, see generally Fernández de Casadevante Romani, C. (2010), 
“International Law of Victims”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 14, pp. 220-272, pp. 253-
270.  
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3. CRIMINAL LAW RESPONSES 
Paragraph 6 of UNSC Resolution 2178 is one of the key provisions of this 
instrument. It imposes on all States the duty of ensuring that their domestic laws 
give the ability to prosecute and penalize in a duly manner a list of conducts related 
to foreign terrorist fighters. This list includes: travel or attempt to travel to a State 
other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the 
perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the 
providing or receiving of terrorist training (a); the wilful provision or collection of 
funds with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they 
are to be used, in order to finance the travel of individuals for the purpose of 
terrorism (b); the wilful organization, or other facilitation, including acts of 
recruitment, of the previous acts of travelling (c)41.  
The UN has not been the only organization to require the criminalisation of 
certain conducts related to the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. In 2015, the 
Council of Europe decided to create the Committee on Foreign Terrorist Fighters 
and Related Issues (COD-CTE) in order to elaborate a Draft Protocol to the Council 
of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. That same year, the 
Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism was approved in Riga (Riga Protocol)42. Following UNSC Resolution 
2178, the Riga Protocol calls upon State Parties to criminalize: participating in an 
association or group for the purpose of terrorism (article 2); receiving training for 
terrorism (art. 3); travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 4); funding 
travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 5); and organizing or 
otherwise facilitating travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 6). 
In addition, the EU adopted the Directive on combating terrorism on March 
2017. It contains three categories of crimes: terrorist offences (article 3); offences 
relating to a terrorist group (article 4) and offences related to terrorist activities 
(articles 5 to 12). The new measures against terrorism are located within the 
category of offences related to terrorist activities, such as receiving training for 
terrorism (article 8); travelling for the purpose of terrorism (article 9); organizing or 
                                                 
41 These same obligations have been confirmed later by UNSC Resolutions 2396 and 2354. UNSC, 
Resolution 2396 of 21st December 2017, Doc, S/RES/2396; Resolution 2354 of 24th May 2017, Doc. 
S/RES/2354. 
42 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196), adopted on 16th May 
2005. For an analysis of the draft of the Protocol see generally Piacente, N. (2015),  “The 
Contribution of the Council of Europe to the Fight Against Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The Draft 
Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005”, The 
European Criminal Law Associations’ Forum 1, pp. 12-15.   
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otherwise facilitating travelling for the purpose of terrorism (article 10); and the 
financing of such acts (article 11)43. 
Last but not least, many States have adapted their domestic legislation to 
penalize and punish these conducts. Italian criminal law prohibits the passive and 
active recruitment for terrorist purposes, as well as travelling abroad (or financing or 
organising it) and training for the purpose of terrorism44. Spain amended its penal 
code in 2015 to include crimes such as self-indoctrination or the attempt to travel 
for terrorist purposes45. France has recently passed new pieces of criminal 
legislation including acts such as travelling and inciting terrorism online46. Germany 
has also approved amendments in its criminal code to prosecute the planning and 
preparatory stages of conducts related to foreign terrorist fighters47. The level of 
implementation of the measures required by UNSC Resolution 2178 depends on the 
region: most European countries have adopted them, while Asian countries have 
included it only partially, and most African countries have not taken specific 
criminal measures against foreign terrorist fighters48.  
3.1. Impact on the individual 
Thanks to the inclusion of these conducts within new categories of crimes of 
terrorism, or as a part of more general terrorism-related offences, many foreign 
terrorist fighters have been condemned on these bases by national courts. According 
to a report published in 2017, approximately ten per cent of cases concerning 
foreign terrorist fighters in the US have resulted in a trial, all of them resulting in 
convictions with an average sentence of 32.5 years49. The specific treatments, 
                                                 
43 For a comprehensive study of this legal instrument see generally Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, J. 
(2017), “A New Chapter in the EU Counterterrorism Policy? The Main Changes Introduced by the 
Directive 2017/541 on Combating Terrorism”, XXXVII Polish Yearbook of International Law, pp. 185-
201.  
44 Law No. 43 of 17 Avril 2015. For this topic, see Marone, F. (2016), “Italy’s Jihadists in the Syrian 
Civil War”, ICCT Research Paper, 2016. Available at:  
https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ICCT-Marone-Italys-Jihadists-in-the-Syrian-Civil-War-
August2016-1.pdf    
45 Ley Orgánica 2/2015, de 30 de marzo, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de 
noviembre, del Código Penal, en material de delitos de terrorismo, published in BOE Núm. 77, Sec. I, p. 
27177. Available online at: https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/03/31/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-3440.pdf 
46 Heinke, T., and Raudszus, R. (2018), “Germany’s Returning Foreign Fighters and What to Do About 
Them, in: T. Renard and R. Coolsaet (eds.), Returnees: Who Are They, Why They Are (Not) Coming 
Back and How Should We Deal with Them”, Egmont Paper 101, 2018, pp. 41-54, p. 50. 
47 Chalkiadaki, V. (2015), “The French ‘War on Terror’ in the post-Charlie Hebdo Era”, The European 
Criminal Law Associations’ Forum 1, 2015, pp. 26-32, p. 31. 
48 For a regional analysis see UNSC, Third Report of Implementation of Security Council resolution 
2178 (2014) by States affected by foreign terrorist fighters, 29 December 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/975; 
UNSC, Second Report of Implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) by States affected 
by foreign terrorist fighters, 2 September 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/683.  
49 Greenberg, K.J. and Weiner, S. (2017), “The American Exception: Terrorism Prosecutions in the 
United States: The ISIS Cases March 2014-August 2017”, Center on National Security at Fordham Law, 
p. 27. Available at:  
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however, differs from one country to another. 6 years has been the maximum 
sentence in the Netherlands, 28 years in Belgium or life imprisonment in Sweden50.  
Despite of the usefulness of the criminal justice response to foreign terrorist 
fighters, the protection of fundamental rights shall also be taken into account.  
UNSC Resolution 2178 recalls generally that all States must ensure that “any 
measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under 
international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee 
law, and international humanitarian law”. The Riga Protocol establishes in article 8, 
with more detail than UNSC Resolution 2178, the conditions and safeguards which 
shall be taken into account by States when implementing this instrument51. This 
provision is completed with an Explanatory Report, which clarifies the conditions 
for the compatibility of these criminal measures with human rights52. In the same 
sense, article 23 of the EU Directive on combating terrorism contains a fundamental 
rights safeguard53.  
However, are these provisions good enough to protect fundamental rights 
and freedoms? In relation to UNSC Resolution 2178, paragraph 6 has been 
                                                                                                                  
https://news.law.fordham.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/TheAmericanException9-17.pdf  
50 Paulussen, C. and Pitcher, K. (2018), “Prosecuting (Potential) Foreign Fighters: Legislative and 
Practical Challenges”, ICCT Research Paper, p. 22. Available at:  
https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ICCT-Paulussen-Pitcher-Prosecuting-Potential-Foreign-
Fighters-Legislative-Practical-Challenges-Jan2018.pdf  
51 It reads:  
(1)Each Party shall ensure that the implementation of this Protocol, including the establishment, 
implementation and application of the criminalisation under Articles 2 to 6, is carried out while 
respecting human rights obligations, in particular the right to freedom of movement, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and freedom of religion, as set forth in, where applicable to that 
Party, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other obligations under international law. 
(2) The establishment, implementation and application of the criminalisation under Articles 2 to 6 of this 
Protocol should furthermore be subject to the principle of proportionality, with respect to the legitimate 
aims pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society, and should exclude any form of arbitrariness 
or discriminatory or racist treatment. 
52 It reads: 
Parties shall take into account that Articles 2 to 6 criminalise behaviour at a stage preceding the actual 
commission of a terrorist offence but already having the potential to lead to the commission of such acts. 
The conditions under which the conduct in question is criminalised need to be foreseeable with legal 
certainty […]. As always, the principle of the presumption of innocence should be respected, and the 
burden of proof lies with the State. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol 
to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, of 22nd October 2015, paragraphs 
29-30.    
53 It reads: 
(1) This Directive shall not have the effect of modifying the obligations to respect fundamental rights and 
fundamental legal principles, as enshrined in Article 6 TEU. 
(2) Member States may establish conditions required by, and in accordance with, fundamental principles 
relating to freedom of the press and other media, governing the rights and responsibilities of, and the 
procedural guarantees for, the press or other media where such conditions relate to the determination or 
limitation of liability. 
Revista de Estudios Europeos, n. 75, enero-junio, 2020                                                                   rEe 
 
126 
considered as its “most alarming provision”54. First of all, because “the wide array 
of obligations imposed on Member States by Resolution 2178 has led to anticipated 
criminalization that covers both the conduct, i.e. a terrorist offence, and all its 
preparatory acts, regardless of how remote they are”55. The phenomenon of 
anticipated criminalization is especially dangerous in this context because “those 
already targeted by such laws include not only terrorism suspects but also peaceful 
protesters, journalists, political opponents, civil society, and members of ethnic or 
religious groups, many of them Muslims”56. More specifically, it is the lack of 
definition of terrorism in this resolution what can be used as a justification “by 
oppressive regimes that choose to stigmatize as ‘terrorism’ whatever they do not 
like – for instance political opposition, trade unions, religious movements, minority 
groups, etc”57.  
Indeed, the UNSC requires States to criminalise activities included in any 
person’s daily life. In the criminalisation of travelling, for example, “how can it be 
determined whether a person is travelling to Turkey as a tourist or is only using 
Turkey as a transit country to join IS in Iraq or Syria?”58. It is indeed arguable that 
this kind of measures raises, among others, “important concerns about its impact on 
the freedom of movement, the right to return to one’s country of nationality and the 
freedom of entry into a State”59.  
The Riga Protocol has been the target of similar criticism. For Scheinin, this 
instrument also “seeks to address forms of conduct, such as foreign travel, that are 
routinely exercised by law-abiding people for legitimate reasons”60. NGOs such as 
                                                 
54 Scheinin, M. (2014), Back to post-9/11 panic? Security Council resolution on foreign terrorist fighters, 
Just Security. Available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/15407/post-911-panic-security-council-
resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/  
55 Capone, F. (2016), “Countering ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighters’: A Critical Appraisal of the Framework 
Established by the UN Security Council Resolutions”, The Italian Yearbook of International Law 25, pp. 
228-250, p. 249.  
56 Tayler, cit. supra., p. 456. In the same sense, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed 
that “concerns have been raised over the broad nature of certain provisions and the potential this creates 
for the implementation of measures at the national level that may result in violations of human rights 
[…]. For example, […] it has prompted well-founded concerns that the resolution may fuel the adoption 
of repressive measures at the national level against otherwise lawful, non-violent activities of groups or 
individuals”. See Human Rights Council, “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism”, (2014) 
Doc. A/HRC/28/28, paragraph 46.  
57 Marrero Rocha, I. (2016), “Los Combatientes Terroristas Extranjeros de la Unión Europea a la Luz de 
la Resolución 2178 (2014) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas”, Revista de Derecho 
Comunitario Europeo 54, pp. 555-592, p. 587.  
58 Ambos, K. (2014), “Our terrorists, your terrorists? The United Nations Security Council urges states to 
combat ‘foreign terrorist fighters’, but does not define ‘terrorism’”, EJIL Talk. Available at: 
 https://www.ejiltalk.org/our-terrorists-your-terrorists-the-united-nations-security-council-urges-states-to-
combat-foreign-terrorist-fighters-but-does-not-define-terrorism/  
59 Conte, A. (2016), “States’ Prevention and Responses to the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters against 
the Backdrop of International Human Rights Obligations”, in De Guttry et al, cit. supra., pp. 283-298, p. 
286.  
60 Scheinin, M. (2015), “The Council of Europe’s Draft Protocol on Foreign Terrorist Fighters is 
Fundamentally Flawed”, Just Security. Available at:  
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Amnesty International or the International Commission of Jurists have also 
considered that the Riga Protocol can have negative consequences on principle of 
legality, the presumption of innocence, the right to non-discrimination and the 
freedom of movement61. There are even discrepancies regarding these criminal 
measures among the judges of the ECtHR. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, for 
instance, have made clear that they are “based on a highly indeterminate, 
probabilistic judgment on the future conduct of the suspected person”62 and, thereof, 
that “the Convention does not provide a ground for ante o praeter delictum 
deprivation of the right to liberty for the purposes of crime prevention”63. 
Finally, the EU Directive on combating terrorism has been criticised on the 
same grounds. For Murphy, “taken as a whole, the Directive continues the ongoing 
restriction of various mobilities – of finance, information, and people – in the name 
of counter-terrorism. This restriction has been the hallmark of international efforts 
since 11 September 2001. There is an inevitable risk for critiques of such action: on 
the one hand it appears to be restrictive of civil liberties across Europe and on the 
other hand its operational usefulness is unclear. Can such a law be both draconian 
and ineffective?”64.  
In addition, the EU Directive on combating terrorism has been criticised for 
circumventing a common practice in the EU system: the ex ante impact assessment 
on the rights protected by the EU Charter65. Legislative proposals use to include an 
impact assessment with respect to the EU Charter in order to “strengthen the 
defence of EU legislation against legal challenges before the European Court of 
Justice”66. Indeed, “when considering the impacts of a measure for the purpose of 
assessing its proportionality, the Court is investigating its legal impact. Thus, as any 
                                                                                                                  
https://www.justsecurity.org/21207/council-europe-draft-protocol-foreign-terrorist-fighters-
fundamentally-flawed/ 
61 Submission of Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists to the Council of 
Europe Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER): Draft Additional Protocol to the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, AI Index: IOR 60/1393/2015, 7th April 2015. 
Available at:  
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/IOR6013932015ENGLISH.pdf  
62 ECtHR, Tommaso v. Italy (App. No. 43395/09), Grand Chamber, 23 February 2017, partly dissenting 
opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, paragraph 8.   
63 Ibidem, paragraph 31.  
64 Murphy, C. (2016), “The draft EU Directive on Combating Terrorism: Much Ado About What?”, EU 
Law analysis. Available at:   
 http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-draft-eu-directive-on-combating.html 
65 Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, “The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism: Relevance, Coherence and 
Effectiveness”, 2017, p. 17; Meijers Committee, “Note on a Proposal for a Directive on combating 
terrorism”, CM1603, 16 March 2016. Available at: 
 http://www.commissie-
meijers.nl/sites/all/files/cm1603_note_on_a_proposal_for_a_directive_on_combating_terrorism_.pdf 
66 European Commission, Operation Guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights in Commission 
Impact Assessments, SEC (2011) 567 final, p. 5. See also De Schutter, O. (2014), “Impact Assessments”, 
in Peers, S. et al (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary. Hart Publishing. 
Oxford, pp. 1645-1648.   
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lawyer would do, the Court considers questions such as which changes to the pre-
existing law resulted from the measure in question, whether those changes 
constitute a prima facie interference with fundamental rights, and if so whether that 
interference is proportionate”67. In this specific case, however, the EU Commission 
decided not to elaborate it due to the “urgent need to improve the EU framework”68.  
3.2. Impact on the State 
The criminal law response of the international community against foreign 
terrorist fighters has also had an impact on States. Criminal law, as a reflection of 
the State’s monopoly of legitimate use of violence69, has always been closely related 
to the sovereignty of the State70. In consequence, every development of criminal law 
at the international level has been particularly respectful with State’s sovereignty71. 
Even the EU, an international organization of integration, has been traditionally 
cautious in the exercise of its competence of harmonization of criminal laws in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice72.  
In the case of substantive international crimes such as aggression, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, progress has been made, after the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, thanks to ratifications of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and the development of customary international law 
(which requires the elements of State practice and opinio iuris)73. On the other hand, 
national crimes with transnational elements, such as terrorism, are usually 
criminalised on the base of multilateral conventions, which also gives a framework 
of cooperation among States parties74.  
                                                 
67 F. De Londras, “Accounting for Rights in EU Counter-Terrorism: Towards Effective Review”, 22 (2) 
Columbia Journal of European Law, 2016, pp. 237-274, p. 256.  
68 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, COM (2015) 625 final, 
p. 12.  
69 Weber, M. (1948), “Politics as a vocation”, in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, (eds. and transl.) from M. 
Weber, Essays in sociology. Oxford University Press. New York, pp. 77–128, p. 78.  
70 Funk, A. (2003), “The Monopoly of Legitimate Violence and Criminal Policy”, in Heitmeyer, W. and 
Hagan, J. (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research. Springer. Dordrecht, pp. 1057-1077.  
71 For a general analysis on the introduction of criminal law in the supranational arena see Ambos, K. 
(2013), “Punishment without a Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue of International Criminal Law: A First 
Contribution towards a Consistent Theory of International Criminal Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 33 (2), pp. 293-315.  
72 Mitsilegas, V. (2010), “European Criminal Law and Resistance to Communautarisation after Lisbon”, 
New Journal of European Criminal Law 1 (4), pp. 458-480.  
73 Bassiouni, M.C. (1983), “The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law”, 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 15 (1), pp. 27-37; Ambos, K. and Timmermann, A. 
(2014), “Terrorism and customary international law”, in Saul. B. (ed.), Research Handbook on 
International Law and Terrorism. Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham, pp. 20-38; Cassese, A. (2006), 
“The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 4, pp. 933-958. 
74 Wilmshurst, E. (2010), “Transnational Crimes, Terrorism and Torture”, in Cryer, R. et al (eds.), An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, pp. 
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Apart from being developed by treaties and customary law, international 
criminal law has also been developed by the activity of the UNSC, an organ 
composed by just fifteen Members of the United Nations75. For example, both the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda were set up by a resolution of the UNSC76. And, in 
both cases, “because the tribunals are created pursuant to the Security Council's 
Chapter VII powers, they may only be established to confront discrete threats to 
international peace and security. Accordingly, the tribunals would have a defined 
and limited temporal and geographic competence, and once they had completed 
their tasks they would be dissolved”77.  
We have already seen that the criminal justice response to foreign terrorist 
fighters has been led by the UNSC. The participation of this organ in the fight 
against terrorism is not a new phenomenon: “Resolution 2178 is not a stand-alone 
document, on the contrary, it extensively relies on the existing skeleton of anti-
terrorism norms developed by the international community and as such it inherits, 
and even amplifies, a number of problems”78. After the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001, the UNSC decided to consider these acts, “like any act of 
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security”79. This 
resolution has been largely criticised because it expands the concept of threat to 
international peace and security from specific acts to “any act of international 
terrorism”80.  
However, from the perspective of criminal law, the most important provision 
can be found in a resolution adopted some weeks later. The UNSC decided in its 
Resolution 1373 that all States shall “criminalize the wilful provision or collection, 
by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories 
with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to 
be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts”. For the first time, the UNSC called 
upon States to criminalise a specific conduct. Although this obligation was already a 
part of the 1999 Convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism, 
Resolution 1373 had the effect of extending this obligation to all members of the 
UN, disregarding the position of those States that did not ratify that convention81.  
                                                                                                                  
335-336; Gaeta, P. (2009), “International Criminalization of Prohibited Conduct”, in Cassese, A., The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice. Oxford University Press. Oxford, pp. 63-74, p. 63.  
75 Article 23 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations.  
76 Respectively, UNSC Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/808; UNSC Resolution 
955 of 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955.  
77 Goldstone. R.J. and Simpson, J. (2003), “Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a 
Legal Response to Terrorism”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16,pp. 13-26, p. 20.  
78 Capone, cit. supra., p. 231.   
79 UNSC Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368.  
80 See generally Duffy, H. (2015), The ‘War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, p. 275.  
81 Rosand, E. (2004), “The Security Council As ‘Global Legislator’: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?”, 
Fordham International Law Journal 28 (3), pp. 542-590.  
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The scholarship has been divided ever since between those who accept the 
exercise of such legislative power by the UNSC82, and those who consider that this 
kind of actions are beyond the competences of this political organ83. Perhaps an 
intermediate position asking for an amendment of the UN Charter would be the best 
option: “in the absence of those reforms, the dangers hidden behind the SC’s 
normative activity are many and serious. It cannot be ruled out that, at a given 
moment, a SC under pressure from the circumstances would opt to impose general 
obligations, with the aim to break the tough opposition of a significant group of 
States to accept certain compromises. However, the international legal order is 
based on State consent, as a corollary of an international society made up of 
independent sovereign States. If the foundations are attacked, the whole edifice can 
collapse”84.  
The obligation to criminalise a list of conducts related to foreign terrorist 
fighters follows the same pattern that Resolution 1373. With one difference: while 
the financing of terrorism had already been enlisted by previous international 
conventions, the conducts enlisted in Resolution 2178 were not. In the foreign 
fighters’ case, there was no previous practice of the international community, and 
the UNSC just created a new set of ex novo obligations for all States85. With 
Resolution 2178, the UNSC has affirmed again that it can invade sovereign domains 
such as criminal law, imposing general obligations “to address a particular crisis in 
a widespread way”86.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Two of the most known reactions against the phenomenon of foreign terrorist 
fighters are revocation of citizenship and preventive criminal law. Both of them 
have the potential to disturb the rights and obligations of the individuals, as well as 
the delicate balance of international relations between States.  
                                                 
82 Alvarez, J.E. (2003), “Hegemonic International Law Revisited”, American Journal of International 
Law 97 (4), pp. 873-888; Szasz, P.A. (2002), “The Security Council Starts Legislating”, American 
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86 Feinberg, M. (2016), Sovereignty in the Age of Global Terrorism: The Role of International 
Organizations. Brill Nijhoff. Leiden, p. 41.  
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Some States have recently adopted citizenship revocation as a measure to 
increase their national security against suspected terrorists. This measure does not 
have a basis on the international counterterrorism framework. It is undeniable that 
the power to revoke citizenship belongs to the State, under certain conditions. 
However, this power must be carefully exercised. First, because it strips individuals 
of their political and private life. Second, because in the case of suspected terrorists, 
it is a way to export security risks to countries, with probably less resources, which 
have accepted foreigners on their territory under the assumption that these 
individuals can be returned to their home States.  
Contrary to revocation of citizenship, preventive criminal measures have a 
clear basis on recent instruments adopted by the UN, the EU and the Council of 
Europe. These measures can have an extreme negative impact on the rights on the 
individuals though. At the end, it will depend on the State’s commitment with 
procedural safeguards. The obligation to ensure a sufficient criminal framework 
imposed on States by the UNSC is a step further in the role of this organ as a 
“universal legislator” in the fight against terrorism, interfering with criminal law as 
one of the traditional competences of the State.  
Finally, it can be argued that the raison d’être of these responses against 
foreign terrorist fighters are radically incompatible. On the one hand, the goal of the 
international criminal law framework against terrorism, which includes UNSC 
Resolutions and UN sectorial conventions, is to deny “safe heavens” to terrorists by 
imposing on their States of nationality the obligation to establish jurisdiction and, at 
some point, to prosecute and punish them. On the other hand, revocation of 
citizenship is just a way to elude responsibility by exporting a national security risk. 
It is difficult to imagine how States can revoke citizenship on grounds of terrorism 
and, at the same time, respect international obligations to prevent and suppress 
terrorism.  
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